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Key facts
£9bn
up-front funding for 
higher education in 
England, including grants 
and tuition fee loans. 
Increased from £6 billion 
in 2007/08
85%
of up-front funding 
directly followed 
students in 2015/16, 
up from 23% in 2007/08
32%
of undergraduates from 
England consider their 
course value for money, 
down from 50% in 2012
2 million approximate number of students currently in higher education
£50,000 average debt on graduation for a student starting a three-year 
degree in 2017
58% of 15- to 18-year-olds, the typical age at which decisions on 
higher education are made, had not received any form of fi nancial 
education that would improve their fi nancial capability and help 
protect them from making poor choices
26% of 18-year-olds from the most disadvantaged backgrounds 
entering higher education aged 18 or 19, up from 21% in 2011
87 providers in the top 90 institutions charged the maximum 
permissible tuition fee of £9,000 per year for all of their 
courses in 2016/17
£1.5 billion increase in capital investment between 2011/12 and 2015/16 
by English universities
2% of students switch provider each year
55% drop in the number of part-time students between 2011/12 
and 2015/16
The convention used throughout this report is that academic years are written as 
2012/13 and financial years are written as 2012-13.
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Summary
1 In England, higher education covers all taught education above A-level and 
equivalents. Most of the 2 million higher education students are on degree courses in 
universities. Higher education also includes other courses such as certificates, diplomas 
and foundation degrees, and is also taught in colleges and alternative providers.
2 Government invests in higher education for its key contribution to creating a skilled, 
educated economy and society. The Department for Education’s (the Department’s) 
up-front public funding for higher education in England, in the form of grants and 
tuition fee loans, is now over £9 billion a year, an increase from £6 billion in 2007/08. 
Up-front funding per undergraduate increased in real terms over the same period, 
from £5,381 to £7,903 in 2016 prices. 
3 Students pay for higher education with student loans, which create a legal 
obligation for them to make repayments based on earnings after finishing their studies. 
This is different from most further education courses or apprenticeships, where costs 
are fully met from general taxation or contributions by employers. Any unpaid student 
loan balance is written off after 30 years. The Department estimates that around  
40–45% of the value of student loans will not be repaid. 
4 In recent years, the government has increasingly delivered higher education 
using market mechanisms, in particular relying more on student choice and provider 
competition to improve quality, and value for money. Some 85% of up-front funding now 
directly follows student choice (up from 23% in 2007/08) via tuition fee loans, which the 
Department increased from £3,000 to a maximum of £9,000 in 2012 while reducing grant 
funding accordingly. The Department also removed student number caps from 2015/16, 
to increase access to more young people and allow popular providers to expand.
5 The Higher Education and Research Act 2017 introduced further market reforms. 
It establishes a new regulator, the Office for Students (OfS), with a remit that includes 
a focus on competition, student choice and outcomes. The OfS will take a more 
risk-based approach to monitoring provider performance, and its new regulatory 
framework is intended to promote increased choice and diversity. Further changes will 
make it quicker and simpler for new providers to enter the market, with an expectation 
that greater competition may mean some providers will exit.
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6 In introducing these reforms, the Department set objectives to ensure that 
everyone with the potential to succeed, irrespective of background, can: access 
relevant information to make good choices; choose from a wide-range of high quality 
universities; and benefit from excellent teaching that helps prepare them for the future. 
The government’s January 2017 industrial strategy green paper also set actions relevant 
to the sector to address skills shortages in the economy, provide higher quality careers 
information and advice, and test new approaches to lifelong learning.
Scope of this report
7 Our past work on delivering public services through markets has identified that 
government often needs to intervene to correct market failures. For example, public 
service users often need significant support to make good choices, such as from 
GPs or care workers. Higher education has a number of features that make it a particularly 
complex market. It is inherently difficult to choose a course before experiencing it; 
most students only attend higher education once and cannot learn from experience; 
and outcomes are uncertain and depend on the ability and commitment of each 
student as well as the quality of the provider. 
8 This report examines the extent to which market dynamics in undergraduate 
higher education support government’s objectives, and whether the Department 
intervenes effectively to correct market failures. Our assessment of value for money 
rests on the following key factors:
• the extent to which prospective students are able to make informed choices on 
whether to enter higher education, what and where to study, and understand the 
long-term implications of taking on debt (Part Two);
• whether prospective students from all backgrounds can access higher education 
(Part Two);
• whether student choice and provider competition is driving higher teaching quality 
and efficient course pricing (Part Three); and
• the extent to which higher education is delivering government’s objectives related 
to skills needs in the economy (Part Three).
The Department began consulting on a new regulatory framework for higher education 
in October 2017. The detailed proposals in the consultation focus on the challenge 
of improving student choice in the market, by enhancing the information available 
and promoting good student outcomes, and seek to address a number of the areas 
covered in this report. Our findings are presented in this context.
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Key findings
Supporting effective student choice and access to higher education
9 Making an informed choice on whether to enter higher education, and what 
and where to study, is critical given the lifelong impact of this decision. Graduate 
outcomes vary widely by subject, provider and family background, as well as other 
factors such as prior attainment and local labour markets. The difference in median 
earnings between subjects 10 years after graduation is estimated to be up to £24,000, 
and between providers up to £13,000. Graduates earn, on average, 42% more than 
non-graduates. However, graduate earnings for some providers and subjects are lower 
than for non-graduates, emphasising the importance of making an informed choice 
(paragraph 2.6).
10 Prospective students are in a potentially vulnerable position when deciding 
whether to enter higher education and take on a student loan. Higher education 
involves a potentially significant financial commitment, unlike other options such as 
apprenticeships. The average student debt, for a three-year course, on graduation 
is £50,000. This represents a legal financial liability, and is one of the largest financial 
commitments most students will make in their lives. It is likely to be second in scale only 
to mortgages which average £139,000 in the UK. Research in 2016 found that 58% of 
15- to 18-year-olds, the typical age at which decisions on higher education are made, 
had not received any form of financial education that would improve their financial 
capability and numeracy to help protect them from making poor choices. The Financial 
Conduct Authority, which regulates financial service firms, identifies financial capability 
as one of the key drivers of vulnerability (paragraphs 2.7 and 2.8).
11 Higher education has a more limited level of consumer protection than 
other complex products such as financial services. Higher education providers 
must comply with general consumer law, to ensure they do not make misleading 
claims and that courses match their description. Student loans also have certain 
statuory protections, in that repayments are income-contingent and any unpaid 
balance is automatically written-off after a set period. However, higher education has 
some features in common with complex financial services, due to the complexity of 
the product, uncertainty over long-term outcomes, and the financial commitment of 
a student loan. Where financial products are complex and retail consumers may be 
vulnerable to making poor choices, the Financial Conduct Authority expects financial 
services firms it regulates to disclose clearly the risks of such products to potential 
customers, to minimise the risk of mis-selling or sale of unsuitable products. There are 
limited comparable requirements in higher education, however, despite strong financial 
incentives for providers to attract as many students as possible. Prospective students 
have very little access to independent advice (paragraphs 2.9 and 2.10).
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12 The Department has improved information available to help prospective 
students choose their course and provider, but only one in five use it and 
additional support does not adequately reach those who need it most:
• The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) now publishes key 
comparative data on providers and courses, including satisfaction scores, costs, 
and employment and earnings outcomes. Almost all users of the data find it useful, 
but only 20% of prospective students have used the data, dropping to 2% of 
prospective part-time students (paragraph 2.12). 
• Careers advice in schools is an important component of making good choices, 
but is not well targeted. Stakeholders we interviewed felt that subjects chosen 
from age 13 were crucial in determining options available later on, but only 60% 
of 13- to 14-year-olds have access to an external careers adviser at school. Our 
analysis found that students who already discuss their future with teachers and 
parents are 40% more likely to also have access to external careers advisers 
than those who do not. The Department does not have an overarching strategy 
covering this area (paragraphs 2.13 to 2.15).
13 The proportion of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds entering 
higher education has increased, but participation remains much lower than for 
those from more advantaged backgrounds. The Department attempts to make 
higher education accessible to everyone by correcting market incentives for providers 
to prioritise certain groups. For example, providers charging maximum fees must spend 
a proportion of these fees on strategies to improve participation and outcomes for 
under-represented groups. The percentage of 18-year-olds entering higher education 
aged 18 or 19 from the lowest participation areas of the country (which correlates closely 
to lower socio-economic status) increased from 21% to 26% between 2011 and 2016. 
However, 59% attend from the highest participation areas. Research shows this gap is 
mostly explained by educational achievement at school (paragraphs 2.16 to 2.18).
14 Increased participation among disadvantaged students is weighted towards 
lower-ranked providers, which risks creating a two-tier system:
• Between 2011 and 2016, the lowest ranked universities saw an 18% increase in 
the share of students from low participation areas, compared to 9% in the highest 
ranked. Applications have generally shifted towards universities with stronger 
reputations and higher entry requirements in response to market changes, placing 
more financial pressure on other providers. If these trends continue, a two-tier system 
may develop between providers that can compete for the most high-achieving 
candidates and those that struggle to compete at all (paragraphs 2.20 and 2.21).
• There is also a risk of reduced choice for people who are unable to move away to 
study, if financial pressures cause providers to close courses or exit the market. It 
is estimated that around a fifth of students live at their family home while attending 
higher education. Students from disadvantaged backgrounds are less geographically 
mobile and more likely to live in their family home while studying (paragraph 2.22).
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Provider incentives to reduce cost, and improve quality
15 Only 32% of students from England consider their course offers value for 
money, down from 50% in 2012. This figure is the lowest in the UK. Furthermore, 
37% of students from England consider their course poor value. Most stakeholders 
we interviewed considered that these results are likely to be affected by the increased 
contribution English students are making towards course costs (paragraph 3.3).
16 There is no meaningful price competition in the sector to drive down prices 
for the benefit of the student and taxpayer. When the government introduced higher 
fees in 2012, it expected price competition to drive fees to an average of £7,500. In 2016, 
87 of the top 90 English universities charged the maximum permissible fee of £9,000 
a year for all courses. Evidence shows that students use price as a proxy measure for 
quality, and the providers we spoke to were concerned that lowering prices may signal 
poor quality. Providers also choose the purchaser in higher education, which differs from 
most traditional markets where the buyer chooses the product or provider. These factors 
result in weak incentives to reduce costs and fees (paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6).
17 Market incentives for higher education providers to compete for students on 
course quality are weak:
• The relationship between course quality and providers’ fee income is weak. We 
found that, on average, a provider moving up five places in a league table gains just 
0.25% of additional fee income through increased student numbers. Providers are 
attempting to attract students by investing more in marketing and in facilities, with 
capital investment in English universities increasing from £2.35 billion to £3.80 billion 
between 2011/12 and 2015/16. Stakeholders we spoke to were concerned that this 
investment would not lead to a proportionate increase in teaching quality, and was 
unsustainable (paragraphs 3.8 to 3.11).
• The Department has introduced its Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes 
Framework to incentivise teaching quality. The Department published the first 
results in June 2017, based on measures including dropout rates, satisfaction 
scores and employment outcomes. Many stakeholders expressed concern about 
whether ratings meaningfully reflect teaching quality. However, most also felt that 
the framework will encourage providers to focus more on educational quality and 
outcomes (paragraph 3.12).
18 Students can do little to influence quality once on a course, despite 
improvements in complaints handling. In a traditional market, consumers can 
incentivise quality through complaints and redress where services are unsatisfactory, 
or can switch to another provider. The sector ombudsman considers that providers 
have improved their handling of complaints and feedback, with a 25% drop in 
student complaints referred to it since 2014. However, students are unable to drive 
quality through switching providers. Switching rates in higher education appear low 
at 2% a year. Our analysis found no correlation between switching and satisfaction 
scores (paragraphs 3.14 to 3.20).
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19 There is not yet evidence that more providers entering and exiting the market 
will improve quality in the sector, and protections for students are untested. 
Since 2011, the government has sought to reduce barriers to entry, including allowing 
new providers to award their own degrees on a probationary basis. But it is unclear what 
value degrees will have where providers with probationary powers are not awarded full 
degree-awarding powers. Increased competition is likely to lead to more courses or 
providers closing, and there is not yet evidence that providers that struggle financially 
will be of any less quality than those doing well. The new regulatory framework will 
require each provider to have a plan approved by the OfS to mitigate disruption for 
students in cases of closure (paragraphs 3.21 to 3.27). 
20 Government increasingly relies on the market to meet its objectives on skills 
and lifelong learning, but incentives to meet these priorities are weak:
• Providers’ costs vary widely, in 2012 ranging from £7,000 for some subjects to 
£20,000 for others. The Department provides grant funding for high-cost courses, 
many of which it considers strategically important, but providers report that this 
does not fully cover their additional costs. We found that the cheaper a course 
is to run, the more likely a provider is to maintain offers in the face of declining 
applications or expand student numbers in response to more applications. 
The overall proportion of students taking science-related subjects has increased 
since 2011, but there remain significant gaps in priority areas such as engineering 
and technology (paragraphs 3.28 to 3.32).
• Lifelong learning in higher education institutions has fallen significantly since 2011, 
with a 39% drop in mature students and 55% drop in part-time entrants. Providers 
have a financial incentive to prioritise young, full-time students, who are typically 
less costly to teach and have lower dropout rates than mature and part-time 
students (paragraphs 3.33 to 3.35).
Conclusion on value for money
21 The Department increasingly relies on market mechanisms to deliver higher 
education, with 85% of the £9 billion annual funding now directly following students. 
Some aspects of market delivery have brought benefits: there is more choice for 
more capable candidates, and a higher proportion of students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are entering higher education. However, only 32% of students consider 
their course offers value for money, and competition between providers to drive 
improvements on price and quality has yet to prove effective.
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22 The decisions students make when entering higher education have lifelong 
implications for their career prospects, earnings and debt. While information available to 
students to support them in making these decisions has increased, students taking out 
loans lack the level of consumer protection available for other complex products such as 
financial services. Furthermore, the taxpayer will bear the cost of student debt written 
off, but government has limited influence on the overall size and therefore funding for 
the sector, or the course mix. The Department needs a more comprehensive approach 
to the oversight of the higher education market, and must use the proposed regulatory 
reforms to help address the deficiencies identified in this report, if students and the 
taxpayer are to secure value for money. 
Recommendations
The Department should:
a Ensure that careers advice in schools and other support reaches those that 
need it most. It should capitalise on opportunities to join up careers advice and 
tertiary education, now that it has responsibility for both policy areas.
b Work with the OfS to monitor the sector and identify criteria to determine 
whether it needs to intervene, particularly where providers are failing. This 
could include clear objectives for regional provision, to avoid areas of little or no 
provision developing that restrict access to the disadvantaged and less mobile. 
It may also involve monitoring closures, and establishing step-in criteria where 
necessary, to protect priority subjects or the interests of students when providers 
close courses or leave the market.
c Commission an independent review of the new regulatory arrangements 
once these have had time to bed in. This could include the existing commitment 
to review the Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes Framework, and would 
help it understand the extent to which the overall arrangements correct for weak 
market incentives to improve quality.
d Work with the sector to understand incentives for providers to offer courses in 
government’s priority subject areas, and address deficiencies where necessary. 
It should work with other departments, such as the Department for Business, Energy 
& Industrial Strategy, in determining skills needs in the labour market.
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The OfS should:
e Look to learn from other regulators in making the most effective use of 
its new powers. The OfS will be a market regulator, with similar challenges 
to regulators addressing competition and consumer issues in other sectors. 
The Department has set an expectation that the OfS should learn from 
regulatory best practice. This learning could include:
• reviewing the effectiveness of competition in the sector, with assistance from 
the Competition and Markets Authority as necessary; 
• ways to empower students to make informed decisions, whether through 
direct regulation or other means; and 
• understanding how to monitor potential threats to the sector and translate 
these into effective stress-testing and preventative action (particularly in 
student protection plans).
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Part One
The higher education market
1.1 In England, higher education covers all taught education above A-level and 
equivalents. Most of the 2 million students are on degree courses, but higher education 
includes other courses such as certificates, diplomas and foundation degrees.
Higher education funding and student loans
1.2 Government invests in higher education for its key contribution to creating a skilled, 
educated economy and society. The Department for Education’s (the Department’s) 
up-front public funding for higher education teaching in England, in the form of grants 
and tuition fee loans, has risen significantly. It is now over £9 billion a year, up from 
£6 billion in 2007/08 (Figure 1 overleaf). Up-front funding per undergraduate (before 
accounting for loan repayments) increased in real terms over the same period, from 
£5,381 to £7,903 in 2016 prices.
1.3 Students pay for higher education with student loans, which create a legal 
obligation for them to make repayments based on earnings after finishing their studies. 
This is different from most further education courses or apprenticeships, where 
costs are fully met from general taxation or contributions by employers. In addition 
to tuition fee loans, students resident in the UK for at least three years are also 
eligible for maintenance loans to cover living costs. The government first introduced 
income-contingent repayment loans in 1998. They can be considered a hybrid between 
a loan and a tax as, unlike a traditional loan, repayments are based on a borrower’s 
earnings, and any unpaid balance is written off after 30 years (Figure 2 on page 15).
1.4 In recent years, the government has increasingly delivered higher education using 
market mechanisms, relying more on student choice and provider competition to 
improve quality and value for money. Some 85% of up-front funding now directly follows 
student choice (up from 23% in 2007/08) via tuition fee loans, which the Department 
increased from £3,000 to a maximum of £9,000 in 2012 while reducing grant funding 
accordingly. The Department also removed student number caps from 2015/16, to 
increase access to more young people and allow popular providers to expand.1
1.5 Taxpayer investment in higher education remains substantial, but now relies more 
on loan repayments and therefore on graduates’ future earnings. The Department 
estimates that around 40-45% of the value of student loans will not be repaid. The total 
balance outstanding (including maintenance loans) at March 2017 was £89 billion.
1 Student number caps still apply to medicine and dentistry degrees, and courses in alternative providers.
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Figure 1
Higher education funding in England (£m)
£ million
Note
1 Amounts are in cash terms and do not include maintenance loans for living costs.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Student Loans Company and Higher Education Funding Council for England data
Up-front funding for higher education in England has risen over the past 10 years
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 Tuition fee loans (£m) 1,344 1,918 2,268 2,572 2,852 4,408 5,938 7,291 8,032
 Teaching grants (£m) 4,510 4,632 4,782 4,723 4,341 3,214 2,331 1,548 1,418
Total (£m) 5,854 6,550 7,050 7,295 7,193 7,622 8,269 8,839 9,450
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Figure 2 shows Student loans can be considered a hybrid between a loan and a tax
Higher education providers 
1.6 Most students in England study at one of the 108 English universities. 
Universities receive grant funding directly from government, but are independent, 
autonomous institutions.
1.7 The sector also includes 114 alternative providers (as at November 2017) that do 
not receive grant funding, but offer courses designated by the Department to allow 
students to access tuition fee loans. Seven alternative providers have degree-awarding 
powers, while the rest offer qualifications validated by other organisations such as 
universities or awarding bodies. Most alternative providers are small compared with 
universities: around a third have fewer than a hundred students and only 11 have more 
than a thousand.
 Figure 2
Income-contingent repayment student loans compared with 
traditional loans
Student loans can be considered a hybrid between a loan and a tax
Income-continent repayment 
student loans
Traditional loans
Type of borrowers 
lent to
Widely available for students studying 
at UK higher education institutions, 
subject to immigration and 
residency requirements.
Only borrowers who are likely to be 
able to repay, based on various factors 
including credit rating.
Repayment terms 9% of earnings above a threshold 
(£21,000 for entrants since 2012, 
increasing to £25,000 from 
April 2018).
Fixed monthly repayment based on 
amount borrowed.
Interest rate Variable, based on economic 
indicators and borrower’s earnings. 
For entrants since 2012, interest is 
RPI+3% while studying, and between 
RPI and RPI+3% depending on 
earnings after studying.
Fixed or variable, based on economic 
indicators and lender’s costs. 
Loan term Until balance reaches zero or after 
fixed period (30 years for entrants 
since 2012) at which point unpaid 
balance, including interest accrued, 
is written off.
Fixed repayment term, after which full 
loan plus interest needs to be repaid.
Note
1  RPI stands for Retail Price Index, a measure of infl ation.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
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1.8 Finally, there are around 240 further education or sixth form colleges providing 
higher education. Some colleges receive funding directly, while others deliver higher 
education through a subcontractual arrangement with another provider. Most higher 
education students at colleges are registered on non-degree courses such as foundation 
degrees or higher national diplomas.
1.9 Higher education providers also earn income from sources other than undergraduate 
higher education. These can include postgraduate teaching, research, other forms of 
education and training, and commercial activities. In total, the higher education sector 
is a substantial part of the UK economy, contributing an estimated £40 billion a year.
Government reforms and objectives
1.10 The Higher Education and Research Act 2017 introduced further market reforms.2 
It establishes a new regulator, the Office for Students (OfS), with a remit that includes 
a focus on competition, student choice and outcomes. The OfS will take a more 
risk-based approach to monitoring provider performance, and its new regulatory 
framework is intended to promote increased choice and diversity. Further changes 
aim to support a well-functioning market by making it quicker and simpler for new 
providers to enter the market, with an expectation that greater competition may mean 
some providers exit. Finally, the reforms require providers to publish plans to protect 
students in the event of the course or provider closing.
1.11 In introducing these reforms, the Department set objectives to ensure that 
everyone with the potential to succeed, irrespective of background, can: access 
relevant information to make good choices; choose from a wide-range of high-quality 
universities; and benefit from excellent teaching that helps prepare them for the future. 
The government’s January 2017 industrial strategy green paper also set actions relevant 
to the sector to address skills shortages in the economy, provide higher quality careers 
information and advice, and test new approaches to lifelong learning.3
2 Higher Education and Research Act 2017 (c. 29).
3 HM Government, Building our Industrial Strategy, green paper, January 2017.
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Scope of this report
1.12 Our past work on delivering public services through markets has identified that 
government often needs to intervene to correct market failures. For example, public 
service users often need significant support to make good choices, such as from GPs 
or care workers. Higher education has a number of features that make it a particularly 
complex market. For example, it is inherently difficult to choose a course before 
experiencing it; most students only attend higher education once and cannot learn from 
experience; and outcomes are uncertain and depend on the ability and commitment of 
each student as well as the quality of the provider.
1.13 This report examines the extent to which market dynamics in undergraduate higher 
education support government’s objectives, and whether the Department intervenes 
effectively to correct market failures. Our assessment of value for money rests on the 
following key factors:
• the extent to which prospective students are able to make informed choices on 
whether to enter higher education, what and where to study, and understand the 
long-term implications of taking on debt (Part Two);
• whether prospective students from all backgrounds can access higher education 
(Part Two);
• whether student choice and provider competition is driving higher teaching quality 
and efficient course pricing (Part Three); and 
• the extent to which higher education is delivering government’s objectives related 
to skills needs in the economy (Part Three).
1.14 The Department began consulting on a new regulatory framework for higher 
education in October 2017. The detailed proposals in the consultation focus on the 
challenge of improving student choice in the market, by enhancing the information 
available and promoting good student outcomes, and seek to address a number 
of the areas covered in this report. Our findings are presented in this context. 
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Part Two
Supporting effective student choice 
and access to higher education
2.1 The government ended control of student numbers in 2015, with the aim of 
increasing higher education participation and ensuring that any individual with the 
grades required could participate. The proportion of 18-year-olds in England entering 
higher education aged 18 or 19 in 2016 was 43%, the highest on record.
2.2 Our past work has found that individuals often need significant support to make 
good choices when accessing public service markets, either due to the complexity of 
the market or because of the vulnerability of the user. The decision on whether or not 
to participate in higher education, and the subsequent choice of course and provider, 
is made at a young age (typically 16 to 17 years old) and can have long-lasting impacts 
on future employment and earnings outcomes. It also requires a potentially substantial 
long-term financial commitment in the form of student loan repayments.
2.3 This part considers:
• the complex nature of higher education and the potential impacts of making 
good or bad decisions;
• what the Department for Education (the Department) is doing to provide 
information, advice, and support to help prospective students make 
good decisions; and
• trends in access and participation between different higher education 
providers and groups of students.
Student choice
2.4 In any market, consumers or service users need accessible, relevant, comparable 
and accurate information to help them choose the most appropriate service, at the most 
competitive price. Where services or markets are especially complex, consumers often need 
additional support and protection to make good choices. Active and engaged consumers 
stimulate providers to compete for their custom, and help to secure value for money.
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2.5 The higher education market is complex and has a number of features that make 
it particularly difficult for prospective students to make good choices. In particular: 
• higher education is not a discrete market, but part of a wider tertiary education 
system that includes further education and apprenticeships;
• there is a wide range of choice, and what might suit one person may not be 
suitable for another; 
• it is inherently difficult to choose a course before experiencing it; 
• most students only attend higher education once and are not in a position to 
learn from previous experience; 
• the true value of a qualification may only become apparent after some time; and
• outcomes depend on the ability and commitment of each student as well as the 
quality of the provider.
2.6 Choices in higher education have a significant bearing on outcomes, with bad 
decisions potentially leading to poor financial outcomes. Graduate outcomes vary 
widely by subject, provider and family background, as well as other factors such as prior 
attainment and local labour markets. The difference in median earnings between subjects 
10 years after graduation is estimated to be up to £24,000, and between providers up 
to £13,000.4 While on average graduates earned 42% more than non-graduates in 2016, 
graduate earnings from some providers and subjects are lower than for non-graduates 
who also have not incurred the liability of repaying a student loan.
2.7 Taking out a student loan for higher education also represents a potentially 
significant financial commitment. The average student debt, for a three-year course, 
is £50,000 on completion. The Department estimates that, on average, borrowers will 
repay around £30,000 in current prices (the rest paid by government from general 
taxation), based on estimated future graduate earnings. This is one of the largest 
financial commitments most students will make, likely to be second in scale only to 
mortgages which average £139,000 in the UK. Unlike traditional debt, however, student 
loans have certain statutory protections, including the fact that repayments are based 
on earnings, and that any liability is written off after a set amount of time, regardless of 
how much has actually been paid back.
4 Institute for Fiscal Studies, How English domiciled graduate earnings vary with gender, institution attended, subject and 
socio-economic background, April 2016.
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Figure 3 shows The Financial Conduct Authority sets high-level outcomes that firms should adhere to
2.8 The complexity, uncertainty over outcomes, and financial commitment mean that 
the overall decision to embark upon higher education, including what and where to 
study, has features in common with some complex financial services. The Money Advice 
Service has objectives to enhance the public’s ability to manage their own financial affairs 
and understanding of financial matters, and avoid making poor choices. The Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), which regulates financial services firms, considers low literacy, 
numeracy and financial capability to be risk factors for vulnerability.5 Research in 2016 
found that 58% of 15- to 18-year-olds, the typical age at which decisions on higher 
education are made, had not received any form of financial education that would improve 
their financial capability and help protect them from making poor choices.6
2.9 Where financial products are complex and retail consumers may be vulnerable to 
making poor choices, the FCA expects financial services firms it regulates to disclose 
clearly the risks of such products to potential customers, to minimise the risk of 
mis-selling or sale of unsuitable products. The FCA requires firms and financial advisers 
to pay due regard to the interests of customers and treat them fairly, supported by six 
high-level outcomes that focus on making good choices (Figure 3). It has powers to take 
action against firms it judges not to be following the FCA’s rules and principles, including 
levying fines or removing their authorisation to sell financial products. The FCA has also 
focused on highlighting the needs of the most vulnerable and least resilient groups 
of consumers.7
5 Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No.8: Consumer Vulnerability, February 2015.
6 The London Institute of Banking & Finance, Young Persons’ Money Index 2016, December 2016.
7 Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Mission: Our Future Approach to Consumers, November 2017.
Figure 3
Consumer protection in fi nancial services
The Financial Conduct Authority has published six high-level outcomes that firms strive to 
achieve to ensure fair treatment of customers
Outcome 1 Consumers can be confident they are dealing with firms where the fair treatment of 
customers is central to the corporate culture.
Outcome 2 Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed to meet the 
needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted accordingly.
Outcome 3 Consumers are provided with clear information and are kept appropriately informed before, 
during and after the point of sale.
Outcome 4 Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes account of 
their circumstances.
Outcome 5 Consumers are provided with products that perform as firms have led them to expect, and 
the associated service is of an acceptable standard and as they have been led to expect.
Outcome 6 Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed by firms to change 
product, switch provider, submit a claim or make a complaint.
Source: Financial Conduct Authority
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2.10 There are limited comparable disclosure requirements for higher education 
providers, despite strong financial incentives to seek to attract as many students as 
possible. Consumer law covers higher education and is enforced by the Competition 
and Markets Authority, which issued specific guidance in 2015. Higher education 
providers must therefore accurately describe courses and not make misleading claims. 
However, requirements for providers to ensure that prospective students understand 
their prospects, alternative options and the financial commitment that comes with a 
student loan are limited. The Department is consulting on a new outcomes-based 
regulatory framework for higher education, as part of which it has sought to learn from 
other regulators. The framework will require providers to publish certain information, 
for example on applications, offers, acceptances and graduate outcomes by gender, 
ethnicity and socio-economic status. However, the Department does not propose to 
require providers to disclose this type of information to prospective students directly.
Information to make choices 
2.11 The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) found in 2015 that 
prospective students’ main sources of information are universities’ websites and the 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) website. We found that providers’ 
websites vary widely in content and format. They normally offer lots of information, but 
not in a comparable way, and data on outcomes and prospects are often either hidden 
or missing entirely. The UCAS website, meanwhile, provides standardised basic data 
on each course’s duration, location, tuition fees, entry requirements and whether it is  
full- or part-time.
2.12 The Department and its partner organisations have worked to improve key 
comparative data available to help decision-making. HEFCE has refined the official 
Unistats website, which covers all UK higher education providers, to provide data such 
as student satisfaction scores, course costs, and employment and earnings outcomes. 
HEFCE’s 2015 review found that 97% of Unistats users found it somewhat or very useful. 
However, use of Unistats is low, with only 20% of prospective students using it, dropping 
to only 2% of prospective part-time students. The Department plans further improvements 
to the information available for students, but it remains to be seen to what extent this 
information will be used.
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Careers advice
2.13 Stakeholders we interviewed consistently felt that choices made from age 13 
onwards have a strong bearing on the eventual career options available later on. 
The Department has also stated that independent, face-to-face careers advice to 
provide information, nurture students’ ambitions and provide positive role models is vital.
2.14 We found that many school pupils do not receive careers advice, either at the 
right time or at all. Our analysis of published survey data from 2013 found that only 
60% of 13- to 14-year-olds had any access to an external careers adviser at school. 
The Education and Business, Innovation and Skills select committees jointly reported 
in 2016 that careers education, advice and guidance in English schools is patchy and 
often inadequate.
2.15 External careers advice does not necessarily reach those who need it most, and 
the Department does not have an overarching strategy in this area. The Department 
acknowledges that careers advice is particularly valuable for children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, those who are at risk of disengaging, and those who have disabilities or 
special educational needs. We found that pupils who already discuss their future with 
teachers and parents are 40% more likely to also have access to an external careers 
adviser than those who do not.
Access to higher education
Widening participation
2.16 The Department has objectives to ensure equal access to higher education, 
regardless of an individual’s background. Traditional market incentives usually mean that 
providers prioritise certain consumer or user groups, particularly if the provider is under 
financial pressures. The Department attempts to mitigate such incentives with a number 
of measures. For example, providers charging maximum fees must spend a proportion 
of these fees on strategies to improve participation and outcomes for under-represented 
groups (such as offering bursaries for poorer students), and to report annually on progress.
2.17 The Department has increased participation among those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, but a large socio-economic gap remains. The percentage of 18-year-olds 
entering higher education aged 18 or 19 from the lowest-participation areas of the 
country (which correlates closely to lower socio-economic status) increased to 26% 
in 2016, up from 21% in 2011. This compares with 59% from the highest participation 
areas, a gap of 33 percentage points.
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2.18 The socio-economic gap in higher education choices is mostly explained by 
differences in how well students did at school or college. Research has found that 
achievement at age 18 explains 90% of the socio-economic gap in participation, 
both in higher education generally and in high status institutions.8 The Department is 
therefore heavily dependent on the school system to achieve its participation objectives 
in higher education. The gap also reflects other factors, including financial constraints, 
institutional barriers (such as admissions processes) and differences in motivation that 
may stem from fewer suitable learning opportunities.
Trends in applications and acceptances
2.19 Since the increase in tuition fees in 2012, and removal of student number 
caps in 2015, applications have shifted towards providers with stronger reputations. 
Overall full-time enrolments to English higher education providers have remained 
stable (Figure 4 overleaf). However, we analysed application data between 2011 
and 2016 against league table rankings, as a proxy for a provider’s overall reputation.9 
Applications increased by more than 10% among higher-ranked universities over the 
period. As overall student numbers have not increased, this has meant substantial 
drops in applications to lower-ranked providers (Figure 5 on page 25).
2.20 Increased participation among students from disadvantaged backgrounds is 
weighted towards lower-ranked providers, compared with those from more advantaged 
backgrounds. Fewer applications puts pressure on institutions to compensate by 
recruiting more students from backgrounds with low participation in higher education. 
Higher status institutions also tend to have higher entry requirements, meaning fewer 
choices for people with lower prior attainment. We found that the lowest-ranked 
universities saw an 18% increase in the share of students from low participation areas 
between 2011 and 2016, compared with 9% in the highest-ranked (Figure 6 on page 26).
8 H Chowdry, C Crawford, L Dearden, A Goodman and A Vignoles, ‘Widening participation in higher education: analysis 
using linked administrative data’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 176 issue 2, 2012, pp. 431–457.
9 League tables vary but normally include measures such as entry requirements, student satisfaction, research quality, 
capital investment and graduate outcomes.
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Figure 4
UK undergraduate first-year enrolments to English higher 
education providers
Full-time undergraduate study has remained stable since 2010 as part-time study has declined
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Figure 5 shows Students are increasingly applying to providers with stronger reputations
Figure 5
Change in applications to English universities and colleges, 2011–2016 (%)
Students are increasingly applying to providers with stronger reputations
Note
1 The data cover main scheme undergraduate applications to English universities and colleges, with tiers based on 
league table rankings. Full data on applications to alternative providers are not available and are therefore not included.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of UCAS and Complete University Guide data 
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Figure 6 shows The share of students from low participation areas has increased, mainly in lower-ranked providers
Risk of a two-tier system
2.21 If recent trends in response to changes in the market continue, a two-tier system 
may develop between providers that can compete for the most high-achieving 
candidates and those that struggle to compete at all. There is a risk that, as a result, 
increased participation among disadvantaged students will not lead to better outcomes. 
Graduates from poorer backgrounds already earn, on average, up to 10% less than 
peers who studied the same subject at comparable institutions. Providers reported to 
us how they are engaging with communities, locally and nationally, to raise participation 
among disadvantaged groups. But it is too early to tell whether these activities will offset 
recent trends.
Figure 6
Change in share of acceptances at English universities, 2011–2016 (%)
Change in share of acceptances (%)
The share of students from low participation areas has increased, mainly in lower-ranked providers
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Figure 7 shows Levels of provision of higher education in England vary substantially
2.22 There is also a risk of reduced choice for people unable to move away to study, if 
financial pressures cause providers to close courses or exit the market. It is estimated, 
for example, that around a fifth of students live at their family home while attending 
higher education. Students from disadvantaged backgrounds are less geographically 
mobile and more likely to live in their family home while studying.10 There are already 
areas of little or no higher education provision in England, and closures may further 
restrict options for certain students (Figure 7).
10 S Gibbons and A Vignoles, ‘Geography, choice and participation in higher education in England’, Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, vol. 42 issue 1, 2013, pp. 98–113
Figure 7
English higher education provision 
Levels of provision of higher education in England vary substantially
Note
1 The calculations are adjusted for the eligible population of young persons in each area. The map is based on analysis 
by the Higher Education Funding Council for England. We have not audited the underlying methodology and analysis.
Source: Higher Education Funding Council for England
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Part Three
Provider incentives to improve 
quality and outcomes
3.1 Competition in a market should incentivise providers to offer the services or 
goods that consumers want at the most efficient price. The complicated nature of the 
higher education market creates potential barriers to this dynamic, particularly as what 
individual students want may not always align well with government’s objectives.
3.2 This part examines the extent to which student choice and behaviour are leading 
to effective competition between providers, improvements in quality, efficient pricing 
and a subject mix that supports government’s objectives relating to skills needs in the 
economy. It considers evidence on:
• the incentives for providers to compete for students on quality and price;
• the extent to which students can ensure actions affect quality once they are 
enrolled on a course;
• the impact of market entry and exit; and
• the incentives for providers to meet government’s objectives regarding subject 
mix and lifelong learning.
3.3 The proportion of students from England who consider that their course offers 
value for money fell from 50% in 2012 to 32% in 2017 (Figure 8). This is the lowest 
proportion and steepest drop in the UK, and compares with 37% of students who 
consider their course poor value. The main factors in perceptions of value for money 
were whether students’ experiences matched their expectations, whether teaching 
staff were helpful and supportive, the ability of staff to explain things, and the variety of 
timetabled sessions. Most providers and other stakeholders we interviewed considered 
that these results were likely to be affected by the higher contribution students make 
towards course costs. Ensuring value for money for students will be one of the four 
primary objectives of the new Office for Students (OfS).
Competing for students
3.4 In a traditional market for goods or services, there is a relationship between price 
and quality, and providers compete on either or both. This varies by sector but can, 
for example, include standard products, basic versions at lower prices and luxury, 
high-quality versions that cost more.
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Price
3.5 There is no meaningful price competition in the higher education sector. 
When the government introduced funding changes in 2011, increasing tuition fees to 
between £6,000 and £9,000, it expected price competition to drive fees to an average 
of around £7,500. However, student behaviour has shown that higher education is 
similar to products where consumers equate price with quality (known as Veblen 
goods). Providers are incentivised to charge the maximum, even for courses that cost 
less, because not to do so could suggest poor quality and reduce demand instead 
of increase it. Any surplus made on individual courses also allows providers to invest 
in the student experience or cross-subsidise more expensive courses that fees do 
not cover. The Institute for Fiscal Studies found that, in 2016, 87 of the top 90 English 
universities charged the maximum permissible fee of £9,000 a year for all courses.11
11 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Higher Education funding in England: past, present and options for the future, July 2017.
Figure 8
Students’ perceptions of value for money 
Proportion of students who consider their course value for money (%)
Students’ perceptions of value for money have declined since 2012
Source: Higher Education Policy Institute, Student Academic Experience Survey 2017
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3.6 The incentives for students to put downward pressure on fees are also weak, 
compared with consumers in traditional markets. The Institute for Fiscal Studies’ analysis 
indicates that more than three-quarters of students will never have to pay back their full 
loan and debt interest. This means that, for most students, a difference of £1,000 a year 
in tuition fees will make little or no difference to their lifetime financial situation. Unlike 
most traditional markets, higher education providers choose their students through 
applications and interviews. Higher education is a significant investment of time and 
important to many students’ aspirations, so few are attracted by lower prices that might 
signal poorer quality.
3.7 Despite the lack of meaningful price competition overall, some providers use 
differentiated pricing to attract specific types of student. For example, providers may 
offer lower fees for students who achieve certain grades at A-level, to attract more 
capable students. Many providers offer cash bursaries or scholarships to students from 
lower income backgrounds. Some providers also reduce fees or increase bursaries in 
August each year, as part of the clearing process, in an effort to fill courses.
Quality
3.8 In principle, university rankings and league tables encourage providers to offer 
high quality education to attract students, but in practice these incentives appear weak. 
Quality in higher education is difficult to discern for prospective students (Part Two). 
Each student will choose a provider for different reasons, often including considerations 
such as location or sports and social opportunities. We analysed enrolment data against 
university rankings, from a well-known league table, from 2010 to 2015. Rankings are 
highly static, with an average change of only five places over the period. An increase of 
five ranking places resulted in just 57 more students a year, translating into additional fee 
income of 0.25% on average.12
3.9 In practice, providers compete in a number of ways that do not necessarily 
relate directly to educational quality. Most providers we spoke to were focusing 
increasingly on marketing and advertising since student number caps were removed. 
For example, one provider had tripled the size of its marketing team, while another was 
planning a £400,000 summer advertising campaign in the run-up to A-level results. 
Our interviewees were aware of some providers offering gifts such as football season 
tickets or iPads to entice students, though none did so themselves. Similarly, providers 
are increasingly willing to make unconditional offers, particularly to high-achieving 
students, to discourage them from looking elsewhere.
3.10 Providers are also seeking to attract students by investing more in facilities. 
Between 2011/12 and 2015/16, capital investment in English universities increased from 
£2.35 billion to £3.80 billion (Figure 9). Capital investment can mean better educational 
facilities, such as academic buildings and libraries, or better student accommodation.
12 Higher rankings can, however, potentially increase income from other sources, such as donations or research funding.
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Figure 9 shows Capital investment in the sector has increased since 2011
3.11 However, there is a risk that increased capital spend represents a zero-sum game, 
with little overall benefit to educational quality. Many providers are striving to provide 
facilities equal to, or better than, their competitors, while future student numbers are 
highly uncertain. The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) reported 
in November 2016 that the sector was forecasting a 12% growth in full-time home 
and EU undergraduate recruitment up to 2018-19. Across the sector as a whole this is 
unlikely to be sustainable, due to declining numbers of 18-year-olds in England and more 
alternatives to undergraduate courses (such as higher apprenticeships).
3.12 The Department for Education (the Department) has introduced its Teaching 
Excellence and Student Outcomes Framework (TEF) to incentivise teaching quality, 
though it is too early to determine its impact. The Department published the first results 
in June 2017, based on measures including dropout rates, student satisfaction scores 
and graduate outcomes. Many stakeholders expressed concern about whether ratings 
meaningfully reflect teaching quality. However, most felt that the framework encourages 
providers to focus more on educational quality. The Department is refining its approach 
to the TEF, and will base results more heavily on employment and earnings outcomes 
data in future.
Figure 9
Capital investment in English higher education providers
Note
1 Full data for alternative providers are not available and are therefore not included.
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency data
Capital investment in the sector has increased since 2011
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3.13 The Department also intends for the new Office for Students (OfS) to be a market 
regulator that will help to drive competition in the interest of students. It proposes to 
promote competition by improving information and transparency regarding providers 
and courses, and making it easier for providers to enter and exit the market. Unlike 
most market regulators, however, the OfS will not have formal competition enforcement 
powers, and will therefore need to draw on the expertise of the Competition and 
Markets Authority.
Students’ ability to drive quality once on a course
Complaints and feedback
3.14 In any sector, an effective complaints process is essential to enable service users 
to bring their dissatisfaction to the attention of the provider and prompt improvement. 
Providers can use information from complaints alongside other feedback to identify 
and address areas requiring improvement, to avoid reputational damage or, in some 
cases, penalties.
3.15  The higher education ombudsman, the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for 
Higher Education (OIA), has seen a drop in complaints since a peak in 2014. The OIA 
investigates complaints that providers have been unable to resolve internally, excluding 
matters of academic judgement which are largely outside of its role. Complaints referred 
to the OIA peaked at 1,877 in 2014 then dropped to 1,411 in 2016, a 25% decrease 
(Figure 10). The OIA attributes this to providers dealing better with complaints and 
feedback internally.
3.16 Providers we interviewed reported that students expect more from them, and 
offer more challenge, than ever before. Many have therefore focused more on feedback 
and complaints. The OIA’s guidance on complaints processes, and the Competition 
and Markets Authority’s guidance on how to comply with consumer protection law, 
have provided useful advice for providers wishing to make improvements. Providers 
also recognised the important role that student unions often play in assisting students 
with complaints and gathering general feedback. Union representatives we spoke to 
agreed that processes have improved, but were concerned that they are not consistently 
effective and do not always find the right balance between efficiency and fairness.
Switching
3.17 In most sectors, where consumers or service users are dissatisfied with their 
provider they can switch to a different provider. Switching can provide a wake-up call 
for providers that are performing poorly, and incentivise them to improve.
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Figure 10 shows Complaints referred to the ombudsman peaked in 2014 and have reduced since
3.18 Switching rates in higher education appear low, and unrelated to changes in 
student satisfaction. Overall, 2% of students transfer provider each year. Our analysis 
of provider data from 2011 to 2016 found no statistical correlation between course 
satisfaction and switching rates (Figure 11 overleaf). It is difficult to make direct 
comparisons with other sectors due to the different nature of the products and services. 
Sectors such as current bank accounts and energy have higher switching rates (4% and 
16% a year respectively), but neither is directly comparable. Current data on student 
transfers may also be incomplete. The OfS will have a duty to monitor and report on the 
availability and use of transfer arrangements.
Figure 10
Complaints to the higher education ombudsman about providers in England
Complaints referred to the ombudsman peaked in 2014 and have reduced since
Complaints
Source: Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education data
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Figure 11 shows  Switching rates in higher education are unaffected by changes in student satisfaction 
3.19 Low transfer rates are affected by inherent barriers to switching between providers. 
These are often logistical or emotional, such as uprooting one’s life and potentially 
moving to another part of the country. Providers in London tend to have more switching 
due to the number of other providers nearby. Six of the eight providers with switching 
rates over 5% are in London. The Department’s 2016 call for evidence on switching 
found that 23% of students who had changed provider found the process difficult or 
very difficult. It is more common for students who do not wish to continue their course 
to switch to another course with the same provider, or simply drop out altogether.
3.20 There can also be academic barriers, due to providers’ academic autonomy and 
the lack of an effective system of credit transfers. There are higher education systems 
overseas where credit transfer mechanisms are more developed. For example, some 
Canadian provinces provide a formal system for universities to recognise each other’s 
credits, making it easier for students to transfer between providers. The Department 
proposes to improve transparency regarding switching by requiring providers to publish 
their transfer arrangements.
Figure 11
Annual changes in transfers and course satisfaction between 2011 to 2016
Change in transfer rate (%)
Note
1 Each dot represents a higher education provider in a given year. We estimated a panel data model and did not a find a 
statistically significant relationship between course satisfaction and switching rates. 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Higher Education Statistics Agency data
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Market entry and exit
3.21 In a traditional market, entry and exit of providers can help strengthen the quality of 
the sector as a whole. New providers can compete with those that are more established, 
and potentially introduce innovative new approaches. As consumers choose providers 
that offer the best service or deal, those that do not keep up lose customers and 
ultimately fail, leaving a stronger sector overall.
New providers
3.22 Since 2011, the government has sought to encourage diversity and competition 
in the sector, including by simplifying market entry. The sector has typically had high 
barriers to entry, including established providers with strong brands and requirements 
for new providers to offer courses validated by other organisations including competitors. 
From 2012/13, students at alternative providers (which receive no direct public funding) 
were able to access tuition fee loans of £6,000 compared with £3,375 previously. 
The Higher Education and Research Act 2017 simplifies entry further by allowing any 
type of provider to access full funding levels if it meets the full regulatory requirements, 
including on quality and standards. It also allows new providers to award their own 
degrees on a probationary basis, subject to quality checks and additional monitoring, 
without having to first demonstrate a lengthy track record.
3.23 While these measures should create fairer competition in the market, some 
also present potential risks to quality. We reported on gaps in oversight of the rapid 
growth among alternative providers in December 2014, with an update on progress 
in October 2017.13,14 It is unclear what value degrees will have where providers with 
probationary powers are subsequently not awarded full degree-awarding powers.
Market exit
3.24 The Department expects increased competition to lead to more market exit. 
In 2017, HEFCE reported that the sector’s 2015-16 financial results showed a sound 
position overall, but with increasingly significant variation between institutions and 
financial strength concentrated in a small number of providers. In principle, market exit 
could involve whole institutional failure or closure, but it is more likely to involve providers 
closing courses, departments or campuses more frequently to stay financially viable. 
In most cases to date, providers have closed courses to new entrants but continued to 
teach out existing students. Providers we interviewed recognised the uncertainty and 
anxiety that closure can create among students and staff.
13 Comptroller and Auditor General, Investigation into financial support for students at alternative higher education 
providers, Session 2014-15, HC 861, National Audit Office, December 2014.
14 Comptroller and Auditor General, Follow-up on alternative higher education providers, Session 2017–2019, HC 411, 
National Audit Office, October 2017.
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3.25 To date, no major provider has fully exited the market, but this may become more 
common. Provider failure in other public service markets, such as the exit of Southern 
Cross – the largest provider of care home beds at the time from the UK social care 
sector in 2011 – demonstrates the disruption to public services that can be caused 
when large providers exit the market in an unplanned manner. In Australia and the US, 
large tertiary education providers have failed or been forced to close by the authorities. 
These have had serious educational and financial consequences for students, who have 
not always found alternative places to study.
3.26 The Department has not yet developed plans to deal with higher levels of market 
exit, or set out how it will improve quality by driving out weaker providers. There is 
not yet evidence that providers that struggle financially will be of lower quality than 
those doing well. The Department’s consultation on a new regulatory framework 
states that exit is a crucial part of a competitive, well-functioning market, and that the 
government will not seek to prevent it and undermine institutional autonomy. In practice, 
decisions on whether to intervene are likely to depend on whether there remains 
sufficient provision in a region, or of priority subjects, though these criteria have not 
yet been established. The consultation makes clear that shortages of provision would 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in line with sector-wide goals or government 
policy objectives.
3.27 The Department also has plans to improve protection for students in cases 
of course or provider closure, though it is too early to assess whether these will be 
sufficient. Its proposed new regulatory framework will require providers to have a student 
protection plan approved by the OfS, to ensure student interests are protected in the 
event of closure. The Department also expects the OfS to take a risk-based approach 
to regulation, monitoring developments and identifying specific threats to providers’ 
sustainability, and reviewing the student protection plans of providers at risk. This overall 
approach to monitoring individual institutions is in line with good practice, but may not 
be enough sector-wide if a number of risks materialise at once.
Market incentives to meet skills needs
Subject mix
3.28 Changes in the higher education market since 2012, including increasing maximum 
tuition fees to £9,000, affect the direct financial incentives for providers to offer different 
subjects. To remain financially viable providers need to ensure they are covering their 
costs. HEFCE’s 2012 analysis of average course costs before the funding changes showed 
significant variation, with some subjects costing under £7,000 on average (Figure 12).
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Figure 12 shows Average course costs vary substantially by subject area
Figure 12
Estimated average course costs in 2010
Average course costs vary substantially by subject area
Price group Subject Average annual 
cost per student1
(£)
A/B Veterinary science 19,670
A/B Clinical dentistry 16,460
A/B Clinical medicine2 14,940
B Physics 10,620
B General engineering 10,010
B Biosciences 9,190
B Civil engineering 8,910
C1 IT and software engineering 8,560
C1 Design and creative arts 8,380
C2 Geography 7,380
C2 Modern languages 7,250
C2 Mathematics 7,060
D Business and management studies 6,720
D Humanities 6,400
D Social studies 6,280
Notes
1 Based on combined cost data from 2007/08 to 2009/10.
2 Medicine course costs only include those funded by the Department for Education, and not the funding 
that is provided by the Department of Health.
Source: Higher Education Funding Council for England analysis produced in 2012
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3.29 The Department provides grant funding for high-cost subjects. Some of these 
high-cost subjects it considers strategically important, such as sciences and engineering. 
The government’s 2017 industrial strategy green paper highlighted skills shortages in 
sectors that depend on science, technology, engineering and mathematics.15 Many 
subjects in these areas are expensive to run, for example due to high facility or equipment 
costs. The Department provides additional funding that includes teaching grants for 
high-cost courses (£652 million in 2017-18) and capital investment for projects to support 
teaching in science-related subjects (£200 million in 2015-16).
3.30 Providers reported that teaching grants for high-cost courses do not cover 
additional costs, creating incentives to prioritise lower-cost subjects. We found 
examples of providers opening or expanding cheaper classroom-based courses to 
strengthen their overall financial position. Our analysis of applications and acceptances 
between 2011 and 2016 also found that the cheaper a course is to run, the more likely a 
provider is to maintain offer numbers in the face of declining applications, or to expand 
student numbers in response to more applications.
3.31 Pressure to prioritise lower-cost courses is often balanced by other incentives, 
for example to maintain a provider’s reputation or graduate outcomes. As such, most 
providers we spoke to sought to maintain expensive but important subjects, and 
covered additional costs with cross-subsidies from other areas including fees from 
international students, commercial income or, in some cases, lower-cost subjects.
3.32 Incentives to offer courses also rely more heavily on student demand, now that 
most funding directly follows students. The Department and its partner organisations, 
such as HEFCE, have increasingly sought to promote science-related subjects to 
young people. The overall proportion of students taking related subjects has increased 
from 42% to 46% since 2011, but there remain significant gaps in some key subject 
areas. Our analysis of university enrolments between 2011/12 and 2015/16 found 
that engineering and technology enrolments, an area of skills shortage particularly 
highlighted by government, saw only a 1% increase, while student numbers fell in 
computer science, mathematics and physical sciences.
Lifelong learning
3.33 Lifelong learning (also called career learning) refers to formal and informal learning 
throughout people’s lives, which often involves part-time study or short courses. 
The government’s 2017 industrial strategy green paper set a specific action to test new 
approaches to lifelong learning.16
3.34 Lifelong learning in higher education institutions has fallen significantly since 2011, 
with a 39% drop in mature students (those aged 21 and over) and 55% drop in part-time 
entrants (Figure 13). There has also been a 44% fall in the number of non-degree 
undergraduate qualifications, such as foundation degrees and Higher National Diplomas 
and Certificates. These drops will be partly offset by the growth in alternative providers, 
which full data are not available for but tend to have more mature students and those 
studying non-degree undergraduate qualifications.
15 HM Government, Building our Industrial Strategy, green paper, January 2017.
16 See footnote 15.
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Figure 13 shows Lifelong learning in the higher education sector has collapsed since 2011 
3.35 We found a range of possible factors contributing to the fall in mature and part-time 
students. A substantial portion of providers’ expenditure is fixed (for example, building 
and equipment costs) often makes part-time study more costly, particularly for those 
that mainly offer full-time study. Part-time and mature students also typically have higher 
drop-out rates. Increased tuition fees for part-time study may also put many students off 
this route, especially if they have family or childcare obligations. It may also have led to a 
decline in employers sponsoring studies for their employees.
3.36 The Department has introduced, or plans to introduce, a number of measures 
that may help to address the drop in lifelong learning in higher education. Part-time 
degree students will be able to access maintenance loans for living costs; providers 
will face fewer barriers to offering accelerated degrees over two years; and the 
Department aims for apprenticeship reforms to support an expansion of higher and 
degree apprenticeships. But the Department has not yet set out an overarching strategy 
for lifelong learning, or what impact it expects these measures to have.
Figure 13
Number of mature and part-time undergraduate entrants in England
Entrants
Lifelong learning in the higher education sector has fallen significantly since 2011 
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Notes 
1 Data for alternative providers are not available for the full period, and are therefore not included.
2 Data include all undergraduate qualifications.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Higher Education Statistics Agency data
 Mature (full and part-time) 284,925 210,130 196,575 177,295 173,225
 Part-time 223,495 149,050 129,120 105,715 100,500
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Appendix One
Our audit approach
1 This study examined the extent to which market dynamics in undergraduate higher 
education support government’s objectives, and whether the Department intervenes 
effectively to correct market failures. It assessed performance to date and considered 
the potential impacts of planned reforms.
2 We reviewed: 
• the extent to which prospective students are able to make informed choices on 
whether to enter higher education, what and where to study, and if they understand 
the long-term implications of taking on debt;
• whether prospective students from all backgrounds can access higher education;
• whether student choice and provider competition is driving higher teaching quality 
and efficient course pricing; and
• the extent to which higher education is delivering government’s objectives related 
to skills needs in the economy.
3 Our audit approach is summarised in Figure 14. Our evidence base is described 
in Appendix Two.
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Figure 14 shows our audit approach
Figure 14
Our audit approach
Our evaluative 
criteria The extent to which prospective students are able 
to make informed choices; and whether prospective 
students from all backgrounds can access 
higher education.
The extent to which student choice and provider 
competition is driving higher teaching quality and 
efficient course pricing, and supporting government’s 
objectives related to skills needs in the economy.
Our evidence
(see Appendix Two 
for details)
• Interviews with providers and sector 
stakeholders.
• Review of published reports on student choice 
and access.
• Review of published reports on the graduate 
wage premium.
• Analysis of the protections in place for students, 
compared to other complex financial services.
• Analysis of student loan debt.
• Analysis of survey data on access to careers 
advice in schools.
• Analysis of trends in higher education applications.
• Interviews with providers and sector 
stakeholders.
• Analysis of the impact of university league table 
ranking on applications.
• Analysis of capital expenditure trends.
• Analysis of the relationship between course 
satisfaction and university switching rates.
• Analysis of offer rates and course costs.
• Analysis of trends in subject enrolments and 
lifelong learning.
The objective of 
government To ensure that everyone with the potential to succeed, irrespective of background, can: access relevant information 
to make good choices; choose from a wide-range of high-quality universities; and benefit from excellent teaching 
that helps prepare them for the future.
How this will 
be achieved A high quality competitive higher education market that meets the needs of students, the economy and wider 
society. Reductions in inequalities in access; more informed choice; and a robust risk-based regulatory regime 
that protects students.
Our study
We examined whether the Department for Education is maximising the extent to which market dynamics in 
the higher education sector support government’s objectives.
Our conclusions
Some aspects of market delivery have brought benefits: there is more choice for more capable candidates, and a 
higher proportion of students from disadvantaged backgrounds are entering higher education. However, only 32% 
of students consider their course offers value for money, and competition between providers to drive improvements 
on price and quality has yet to prove effective. The decisions students make when entering higher education have 
lifelong implications for their career prospects, earnings and debt. While information available to students to support 
them in making these decisions has increased, students taking out loans lack the level of consumer protection 
available for other complex products such as financial services. Furthermore, the taxpayer will bear the cost of 
student debt written off, but government has limited influence on the overall size and therefore funding for the 
sector, or the course mix. The Department needs a more comprehensive approach to the oversight of the higher 
education market, and must use the proposed regulatory reforms to help address the deficiencies identified in this 
report, if students and the taxpayer are to secure value for money.
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Appendix Two
Our evidence base
1 Our independent conclusions on the extent to which market dynamics in the 
higher education sector support government’s objectives around access, choice, 
quality and skills needs were reached following our analysis of evidence collected 
between January and July 2017.
2 We used a range of study methods to reach our conclusion on value for money, 
described below.
3 We carried out case study visits and semi-structured interviews with representatives 
from 17 higher education providers to provide insights into how the higher education 
market is operating. Providers were sampled to capture diversity of provider size, 
region and type:
• The Academy of Contemporary Music
• Aston University
• BPP University
• The University of Cambridge
• The University of Chichester
• Coventry University
• University of Derby
• The University of Exeter
• Futureworks
• GSM London
• The University of Kent
• The University of Lincoln
• London Metropolitan University
• Trinity Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance
• The University of Oxford
• Queen Mary University of London
• The University of Surrey.
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4 We conducted semi-structured interviews with policy officials and representatives 
from sector regulators to explore their regulatory roles within the higher education market:
• Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)
• Office for Fair Access (OFFA)
• Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Students of Higher Education (OIA)
• The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA).
5 We conducted interviews with sector representative bodies to capture the 
perspectives of their members, as well as interviews with charities and stakeholders 
supporting various parts of the sector:
• Association of Colleges (AoC)
• Association of Graduate Recruiters (AGR)
• British Universities Finance Directors Group (BUFDG)
• Guild HE
• Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI)
• The Higher Education Careers Service Unit (HECSU)
• Independent HE
• Million Plus
• National Union of Students (NUS) and other student union representatives
• SEEC
• The Russell Group
• Uni-Quest Ltd
• University Alliance
• The Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS)
• Universities UK (UUK)
• Which?
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6 We spoke to expert academics and examined a range of literature to 
understand the factors affecting student choice and HE participation; and to explore 
the skills gaps in the economy and the employment outcomes for graduates.
7 We analysed data from a range of sources to explore how well the market 
supports access and informed student choice. This included analysis of:
• The protections provided to students when making higher education choices and 
taking out student loans, with comparison to services with similar challenges and 
complexities such as financial services.
• ‘Next Steps’ survey data to explore access to careers advice and guidance in schools.
• HE applications and acceptances data to explore trends in HE participation over 
time and the impacts on students from low participation areas. We used POLAR3 
data when defining areas of low, medium or high participation. These data are 
widely used as a proxy for disadvantage. The data measures the share of eligible 
young persons in an area who enter higher education when 18 or 19.
8 To explore the extent to which market mechanisms are effective in promoting 
quality provision, we carried out:
• Analysis of applications data and university rankings to explore the market 
incentives to improve quality.
• Descriptive analysis of trends in capital expenditure over time in English 
higher education institutions.
• Analysis of the relationship between course satisfaction and university 
switching rates.
• Analysis of trends in applications and acceptances between 2011/12 
and 2015/16 to explore the market incentives to expand lower cost courses.
• Descriptive analysis of trends in subject enrolments between 2011/12 
and 2015/16 to explore changes in take-up of science-related courses.
• Descriptive analysis of trends in mature, part-time and ‘other undergraduate’ 
study to examine how the sector is supporting lifelong learning.
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